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ABSTRACT
This paper characterizes a new research area, called coordination theory, that focuses on the interdisciplinary study of
coordination. Research in this area uses and extends ideas about coordination from disciplines such as computer
science, organization theory, operations research, economics, linguistics, and psychology.
In the framework presented here, coordination is analyzed in terms of actors performing interdependent activities that
achieve goals. A variety of processes are analyzed from this perspective and commonalities across disciplines are
identified. Processes analyzed include goal decomposition, resource allocation, synchronization, group decision-
making, communication, and the perception of common objects.
A major section of the paper summarizes recent applications of coordination theory in three different domains:
(1) understanding the effects of information technology on human organizations and markets, (2) designing
cooperative work tools, and (3) designing distributed and parallel processing computer systems. In the final section
of the paper, elements of a research agenda in this new area are briefly outlined.
1Toward an Interdisciplinary Theory of Coordination
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in questions about how the activities of complex systems can be
coordinated (e.g., Huberman, 1988b; Johansen, 1988; NSF-IRIS, 1989; Rumerhart, et al., 1986; Winograd and
Flores, 1986). In some cases, this work has focused on coordination in parallel and distributed computer systems; in
others, on coordination in human systems; and in many cases, on complex systems that include both people and
computers.
Our goal in this paper is to summarize and stimulate development of theories that can help with this work. This
new research area--the interdisciplinary study of coordination--draws upon a variety of different disciplines including
computer science, organization theory, management science, economics, linguistics, and psychology. There is still
no widely accepted name for this area, so we will use the term coordination theory to refer to theories about how
coordination can occur in diverse kinds of systems. Many of the researchers whose efforts can contribute to and
benefit from this new area are not yet aware of each other's work. Therefore, by summarizing this diverse body of
work in a way that emphasizes its common themes, we hope to help define a community of interest and to suggest
useful directions for future progress.
There are at least three reasons why work in this area is timely:
(1) In recent years, large numbers of people have acquired direct access to computers, primarily for
individual tasks like spreadsheet analysis and word processing. These computers are now beginning to
be connected to each other. Therefore, we now have, for the first time, an opportunity for vastly
larger numbers of people to use computing and communications capabilities to help coordinate their
work. For example, specialized new software has been developed to (a) support multiple authors
working together on the same document, (b) help people display and manipulate information more
effectively in face-to-face meetings, and (c) help people intelligently route and process electronic
messages (see detailed references in section 4.2).
It already appears likely that there will be commercially successful products of this new type (often
called "computer-supported cooperative work" or "groupware"), and to some observers these
applications herald a paradigm shift in computer usage as significant as the earlier shifts to time-
sharing and personal computing. It is less clear whether the continuing development of new computer
applications in this area will depend solely on the intuitions of successful designers or whether it will
also be guided by a coherent underlying theory of how people coordinate their activities now and how
they might do so differently with computer support.
(2) In the long run, the dramatic improvements in the costs and capabilities of information technologies
are changing--by orders of magnitude-the constraints on how certain kinds of communication and
coordination can occur. At the same time, there is a pervasive feeling in businesses today that global
interdependencies are becoming more critical, that the pace of change is accelerating, and that we need
to create more flexible and adaptive organizations. Together, these changes may soon lead us across a
threshold where entirely new ways of organizing human activities become desirable.
For example, new capabilities for communicating information faster, less expensively, and more
selectively may help create what some observers (e.g., Toffler, 1970) have called "adhocracies"-
rapidly changing organizations with highly decentralized networks of shifting project teams. As
another example, lowering the costs of coordination between firms may encourage more market
transactions (i.e., more "buying" rather than "making") and, at the same time, closer coordination
across firm boundaries (such as "just in time" inventory management). To understand and take
advantage of these new possibilities will almost certainly require major extensions or reformulations
of our current theories of organizations, of markets, and of management.
(3) Much recent activity in computer science has involved the exploration of a variety of distributed and
parallel processing computer architectures. In many ways, physically connecting the processors to
each other is easy compared to the difficulty of coordinating the activities of many different processors
working on different aspects of the same problem. An intriguing possibility here is that lessons
learned about coordination in social and biological systems can be applied to coordinating networks of
computer processors.
For these possibilities to be realized, a great deal of cross-disciplinary interaction is needed. In the remainder of this
paper, we define coordination theory in a way that emphasizes its interdisciplinary content, suggest a framework for
developing it further, and then describe how coordination theory has already been applied to the three domains just
described: (1) understanding the effects of information technology on human organizations and markets,
(2) designing cooperative work tools, and (3) designing distributed and parallel processing computer systems. In the
final section of the paper, we will briefly suggest elements of a research agenda for this new area.
2. COORDINATION THEORY
2.1. What is coordination?
We all have an intuitive sense of what the word "coordination" means. When we attend a well-run conference, when
we watch a winning basketball team, or when we see a smoothly functioning assembly line we may notice how well
coordinated the actions of a group of people seem to be. Often, however, good coordination is nearly invisible, and
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3we sometimes notice coordination most clearly when it is lacking. When we spend hours waiting on an airport
runway because the airline can't find a gate for our plane, when the hotel room we thought had been reserved for us
is sold out, or when a company fails repeatedly to capitalize on innovative ideas its researchers develop we may
become very aware of the effects of poor coordination.
In order to proceed, it is helpful to have a more precise idea of what we mean by "coordination." The appendix lists
a number of definitions that have been suggested for this term. The diversity of these definitions illustrates the
difficulty of defining coordination, and also the variety of possible starting points for studying the concept. For our
purposes here, however, we believe it is most useful to start with the following simple definition:
Coordination is the act of working together.
We will refer to this as the "broad" definition of coordination, and we will suggest a more restrictive "narrow"
definition below. In both cases, however, we believe it is useful to use the word "coordination" in a fairly inclusive
sense. For instance, even though the words "cooperation" and "collaboration" each have their own connotations,
much of what they describe falls within this broad definition of coordination. It is also often possible to analyze
"conflict" and "competition" from the point of view of some higher level goals and see that conflict at one level
leads to coherent results at another level. Metaphorically speaking, for instance, two hands clapping may seem to be
opposed to each other, but their combined activity results in a clapping sound. As an organizational example,
different groups in a company may compete for resources and people, but this very competition may contribute to
the company's overall ability to produce useful products (e.g., Kidder, 1981). Even though it is often important to
distinguish between concepts like cooperation, collaboration, and competition, including them all in the same
general framework allows us to examine their relationships and their relative advantages and disadvantages.
2.2. What is coordination theory?
We define coordination theory as a body of principles about how activities can be coordinated, that is, about how
actors can work together. It is important to realize that there is not yet a coherent body of theory in this domain.
However, there are theories, concepts, and results from many different fields that can both contribute to and benefit
from the development of such general theories.
For instance, it is clear that questions about how people coordinate their activities are central to parts of organization
theory, sociology, social psychology, anthropology, linguistics, law, and political science. Important parts of
economics and management science also analyze how people can coordinate their work with a special focus on
rational ways of allocating resources. Computer science does not deal primarily with people, but different
computational processes must certainly "work together," and, as numerous observers have pointed out, certain kinds
of interactions among computational processes resemble interactions among people (e.g., Fox, 1981; Hewitt, 1986;
Huberman, 1988a; Huberman, 1988b; Miller and Drexler, 1988; Smith and Davis, 1981).
These potential overlaps suggest that coordination theory will be like other interdisciplinary fields (such as
cybernetics (Wiener, 1961), and cognitive science (Gardner, 1985)) that arise from the recognition of commonalities
in problems that have previously been considered separately in different fields. For instance, the field of cognitive
science grew out of the recognition by researchers in several different fields (e.g., psychology, computer science, and
linguistics) that they were dealing separately with similar problems: how can information processing systems
(people or computers) do things like use language, learn, plan, remember, and solve problems (e.g., see Gardner,
1985; Norman, 1980)?
In coordination theory, the common problems have to do with coordination: How can overall goals be subdivided
into actions? How can actions be assigned to groups or to individual actors? How can resources be allocated among
different activities? How can information be shared among different actors to help achieve the overall goals?
Identifying and analyzing coordination processes. One of the most intriguing possibilities of coordination theory is
that for a given kind of coordination problem, we should be able to list a variety of alternative coordination processes
that could solve the problem. For example, a resource allocation problem can, in principle, be solved by various
kinds of markets, hierarchies, and other structures. Realizing this can sometimes help think of new design
alternatives that would not otherwise have arisen. We will see below, for instance, how analogies with human
markets have generated some novel resource allocation schemes for computer systems (section 4.3.1).
Of course, merely thinking of new schemes is not as useful as also having a way of judging which schemes are
likely to be most appropriate in a given situation. Therefore, a fully developed coordination theory should also
provide tools for evaluating alternative coordination schemes. For instance, we will see examples below of formally
analyzing the tradeoffs in several generic schemes for task assignment (section 3.4), and the stability properties of
several task allocation schemes in computer networks (section 4.3.2).
Relation to systems theory and cybernetics. In its attempts to find generalizations that apply across disciplines and
across levels of analysis, coordination theory resembles earlier work on systems theory and cybernetics (e.g., Beer,
1967; Boulding, 1956; Emery, 1969; Forrester, 1980; von Bertalanffy, 1950; Wiener, 1961). Coordination theory,
however, does not attempt to analyze everything that happens in complex systems. Instead, as we will see below, it
focuses only on the goal-directed processes of coordination. Furthermore, we are also significantly better equipped
for the task of identifying and analyzing coordination processes now than systems theorists were several decades ago.
For example, in addition to the quantitative tools (such as linear systems theory) used in cybernetics, we now have a
new set of qualitative languages (such as Petri nets (Peterson, 1981) and object inheritance networks (Stefik and
Bobrow, 1986)) that seem promising for formalizing a new class of theories (e.g., Winograd and Flores' (1986)
"conversations for action").
What isn't coordination theory? If coordination theory can draw upon so many different fields, is it any more than
just the union of these fields? How can we look at a theory and decide whether it is or is not an example of
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think it essential to draw sharp boundaries between what is and is not coordination theory. Instead, as in cognitive
science and many other fields, we think certain characteristic questions and approaches will come to typify central
examples of coordination theory. For example, theories that apply to only one kind of actor will probably be less
important to coordination theory than theories that can be applied to several kinds of actors. In this sense, then,
coordination theory will be more like the intersection of the fields from which it draws, rather than the union. By
highlighting a novel set of common questions, however, coordination theory may lead to new insights and results
that would not have arisen if work in each field had been pursued independently.
Applying coordination theory. Any scientific theory (indeed, any statement about the world) must neglect some
things, in order to focus on others. Since coordination theory focuses on principles that apply to many different
kinds of systems, it necessarily deemphasizes things that may be extremely important in particular systems. In
applying coordination theory to any particular kind of system, therefore, it may be necessary to consider many other
factors as well.
For instance, in designing a new computer system to help people coordinate their work, "details" about screen layout
and response time may sometimes be as important as the basic functionality of the system, and the reputation of the
manager who introduces the system in a particular organization may have more effect on the motivation of people to
use it in that organization than any incentive structures designed into the system. Similarly, in designing a
distributed processing computer system, the failure rates for different kinds of communications media and processors
may be the primary design consideration, overwhelming any other considerations about how tasks are allocated
among processors.
There are at least two ways an interdisciplinary theory like coordination theory can deal with differences like these
among systems: (1) parametric analysis, and (2) baseline analysis. In parametric analysis, the abstract theories
include parameters which may be different for different kinds of systems. For instance, the principles of
aerodynamics apply to both birds and airplanes, even though parameters such as size, weight, and energy expenditure
are very different in the two kinds of systems. Similarly, abstract models of coordination may include parameters for
things like incentives, cognitive capacities, and communication costs which are very different in human,
computational, and biological systems.
In baseline analysis, one theory is used as a baseline for comparison to the actual behavior of a system, and
deviations from the baseline are then explained with other theories. For example, in behavioral decision theory (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1973), mathematical decision theory is used to analyze the ways people actually make
decisions. In the cases where people depart from the prescriptions of the normative mathematical theory, new
theories are developed to explain the differences. Even though the original mathematical theory does not completely
explain people's actual behavior, the anomalies explained by the new theories could not even have been recognized
6without a baseline theory for comparison. This suggests that an important part of coordination theory will be
"behavioral coordination theory" in which careful observations of actual coordination in human systems are used to
develop, test, and augment abstract models of coordination.
2.3. Foundations of coordination theory
Even though use of the term "coordination theory" is quite recent, a great deal of previous work in various fields can
contribute to the interdisciplinary understanding of coordination. In this section, we briefly describe examples of
such work from several different disciplines. These examples focus on cases where coordination has been analyzed in
ways that appear to be generalizable beyond a single discipline or type of actor. We have not, of course, attempted
to list all such cases; we have merely tried to pick illustrative examples from several disciplines.
2.3.1. Computer science
Sharing resources. Much research in computer science focuses on how to manage activities that share resources.
For example, operating systems require algorithms for allocating resources-such as processors and memory-to
different processes and for scheduling accesses to input/output devices, such as disks (e.g., Deitel, 1983).
Other mechanisms have been developed to enforce resource allocations. For example, semaphores, monitors, and
critical regions for mutual exclusion are programming constructs that can be used to grant a process exclusive access
to a resource (e.g., Dijkstra, 1968; Hoare, 1975). Researchers in database systems have developed numerous other
mechanisms, such as locking or timestamping, to allow multiple processes to concurrently access shared data
without interference (e.g., Bernstein and Goodman, 1981).
Managing unreliable actors. In addition, protocols have been developed to ensure the reliability of transactions
comprising multiple reads or writes on different processors (e.g., Kohler, 1981). In particular, these protocols ensure
that either all a transaction's operations are performed or none are, even if some of the processors fail.
Segmenting and assigning tasks. One of the important problems in allocating work to processors is how to divide
up the tasks. For example, Gelerater and Carrerio (1989) discuss three alternative ways of dividing parallel programs
into units: according to the type of work to be done, according to the final results, or simply according to which
processor is available.
Managing information flows. Another important set of issues involves managing the flow of information between
activities (e.g., Dennis, 1974). For example, in the producer/consumer problem, the rate of execution of each
process must be regulated to ensure that the producer does not overwhelm the consumer or vice versa. One approach
to this problem is to place a buffer between the two processes and allocate space in the buffer to one process or the
other. Network protocols manage similar problems between communicating processes that do not share any
memory (Tannenbaum, 1981).
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Gasser, 1988; Huhns and Gasser, 1989) have addressed many of these issues. For example, the blackboard
architecture allows processes to share information without having to know precisely which other processes need it
(Erman, et al., 1980; Nii, 1986), and exchanging partial global plans allows nodes in a distributed sensor network to
combine their local actions to achieve global goals (Durfee and Lesser, 1987).
2.3.2. Economics and operations research
In a sense, almost all of economics involves the study of coordination, with a special focus on how incentives and
information flows affect the allocation of resources among actors. For example, classical microeconomics analyzes
how different sources of supply and demand can interact locally in a market in ways that result in a globally coherent
allocation of resources. Among the major results of this theory are formal proofs that (under appropriate
mathematical conditions) if consumers each maximize their individual "utilities" and firms each maximize their
individual profits, then the resulting allocation of resources will be globally "optimal" in the sense that no one's
utilities can be increased without decreasing someone else's (e.g., Debreu, 1959).
Some more recent work in economics has focused on the limitations of markets and contracts for allocating
resources. For instance, transaction cost theory analyzes the conditions under which a hierarchy is a better way of
coordinating multiple actors than a market (e.g., Williamson, 1975). For instance, if extensive legal and accounting
work are necessary for market transactions, then the costs of internal transactions within a hierarchical firrn may be
lower and therefore preferable. Agency theory focuses on how to create incentives for some actors ("agents") to act
in a way that advances the interests of other actors ("principals") even when the principals cannot observe everything
their agents are doing (Ross, 1973). One result of this theory is that there are some situations where no incentives
can motivate an agent to perform optimally from the principal's point of view (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Finally, some parts of economics focus explicitly on information flows. For example, team theory and its
descendants analyze how information should be exchanged when multiple actors need to make interdependent
decisions but when all agents have the same ultimate goals (e.g., Hurwicz, 1973; Marschak and Radner, 1972;
Reiter, 1986). Mechanism design theory also analyzes how to provide incentives for actors to reveal information
they possess, even when they have conflicting goals. For example, this theory has been applied to designing and
analyzing various forms of auctions. In a "second price auction," for instance, each participant submits a sealed bid,
and the highest bidder is only required to pay the amount of the second highest bid. It can be shown that this
mechanism motivates the bidders to each reveal the true value they place on the item being sold, rather than trying to
"game the system" by bidding only enough to surpass what they expect to be the next highest bid (Myerson, 1981).
Operations research analyzes the properties of various coordination mechanisms, but operations research also includes
a special focus on developing optimal techniques for coordination decisions. For instance, operations research
8includes analyses of various scheduling and queueing policies and techniques such as linear programming and
dynamic programming for making resource allocation decisions optimally (e.g., Dantzig, 1963).
2.3.3. Organization theory
Research in organization theory, drawing on disciplines such as sociology and psychology, focuses on how people
coordinate their activities in formal organizations. Some of this work deals specifically with the emotions,
motivations, and cognitive limitations of people. But another central theme in this work has involved analyzing
general issues about coordination (e.g., Galbraith, 1977; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; March and Simon, 1958;
Simon, 1976; Thompson, 1967; summarized by Mintzberg, 1979, and Malone, 1990). We can loosely paraphrase
the key ideas of this work as follows:
All activities that involve more than one actor require (1) some way of dividing activities among the different actors
and (2) some way of managing the interdependencies between the different activities (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967;
March and Simon, 1958). Interdependencies between activities can be of (at least) three kinds: (a) pooled, where the
activities share or produce common resources but are otherwise independent; (b) sequential, where some activities
depend on the completion of others before beginning, and (c) reciprocal, where each activity requires inputs from the
other (Thompson, 1967). These different kinds of interdependencies can be managed by a variety of coordination
mechanisms, such as: standardization, where predetermined rules govern the performance of each activity; direct
supervision, where one actor manages interdependencies on a case-by-case basis, and mutual adjustment, where each
actor makes on-going adjustments to manage the interdependencies (Galbraith, 1973; March and Simon, 1958;
Mintzberg, 1979).
These coordination mechanisms can be used to manage interdependencies, not only between individual activities, but
also between groups of activities. One criterion for grouping activities into units is to minimize the difficulties of
managing these inter-group interdependencies. For example, activities with the strongest interdependencies are often
grouped into the smallest units, then these units are grouped into larger units with other units with which they have
weaker interdependencies. Various combinations of the coordination mechanisms, together with different kinds of
grouping, give rise to the different organizational structures common in human organizations, including functional
hierarchies, product hierarchies, and matrix organizations. For instance, sometimes all activities of the same type
(e.g., manufacturing) might be grouped together in order to take advantage of economies of scale; at other times, all
activities for the same product (e.g., marketing, manufacturing, and engineering) might be grouped together to
simplify managing the interdependencies between the activities.
2.3.4. Biology
Many parts of biology involve studying how different parts of living entities interact. For instance, human
physiology can be viewed as a study of how the activities of different parts of a human body are coordinated in order
9to keep a person alive and healthy. Other parts of biology involve studying how different living things interact with
each other. For instance, ecology can be viewed as the study of how the activities of different plants and animals are
coordinated to maintain a "healthy" environment.
Some of the most intriguing studies of biological coordination involve coordination between different animals in a
group. For example Mangel (1988) discusses the optimal hunting pack size for lions, who trade the benefit of an
increased chance of catching something against the cost of having to share what they catch. Deneubourg (1989)
point out that the interaction between simple rules-such as "do what my neighbour is doing"-and the environment
may lead to a variety of collective behaviors.
The most striking examples of such group behaviors are in social insects, such as honey bees or army ants, where
the group displays often quite complex behavior, despite the simplicity of the individuals (e.g., Franks, 1989;
Seeley, 1989). Using a variety of simple rules, these insects "allocate" individual workers at economically efficient
levels to a variety of tasks-including searching for new food sources, gathering nectar or pollen from particular
sources (bees), carrying individual food items back to the bivouac (ants), guarding the hive (bees) and regulating the
group temperature. For example, in honey bees, the interaction of two simple local rules controls the global
allocation of food collectors to particular food sources. First, nectar storing bees unload nectar from foraging bees
returning to the hive at a rate that depends on the richness of the nectar. Second, if bees are unloaded rapidly, they
recruit other bees to their food source. The result of these two rules is that more bees collect food from better
sources. Seeley (1989) speculates that this decentralized control may occur because it provides faster responses to
local stresses (Miller, 1978), or it may be simply because bees have not evolved any more global means of
communication.
3. TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR COORDINATION THEORY
So far, we have claimed that many different disciplines can contribute to our understanding of coordination and given
examples where this seems possible. But is it really sensible to use the term "coordination" in describing all the
different kinds of phenomena to which we have alluded? For that matter, is there anything in common among these
different phenomena, other than some occasional similarities in terminology? As a first step toward answering these
questions, this section provides a preliminary framework for analyzing coordination. This framework is not a
"theory of everything;" it is only one approach that helps identify the relationships between different views of
coordination and suggests directions for future progress.
3.1. Components of coordination
According to our broad definition of coordination above, coordination means "the act of working together." What
does this broad definition of coordination imply? First of all, what does the word "work" imply? The dictionary
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Components of coordination Associated coordination processes
Goals Identifying goals(e.g., goal selection)
Activities Mapping goals to activities(e.g., goal decomposition)
Mapping activities to actors
(e.g., task assignment)
"Managing" interdependencies
(e.g., resource allocation, sequencing, and
synchronizing)
Table 1. Components of coordination.
defines "work" as "physical or mental effort or activity directed toward the production or accomplishment of
something" (American Heritage Dictionary, 1981). Thus there must be one or more actors, performing some
activities which are directed toward some ends. In what follows, we will refer to the ends toward which the activities
are directed as goals or evaluation criteria. By using the word "together," the definition implies that the activities are
not independent. Instead, they must be performed in a way that helps achieve the goals. We will refer to these goal-
relevant relationships between the activities as interdependencies. These components and the coordination processes
associated with them are summarized in Table 1. (See Baligh, 1986; Baligh and Burton, 1981; Barnard, 1964;
Malone, 1987; Malone and Smith, 1988; McGrath, 1984; Mintzberg, 1979 for related decompositions of
coordination.)
We believe that all four of these components--goals, activities, actors and interdependencies-are necessary for a
situation to be analyzed in terms of coordination. That is, in order to sensibly use the word "coordination" to refer to
a situation you must, at least implicitly, have in mind all four components. For instance, it does not make sense to
refer to a system as being coordinated if there are no activities performed or if the activities are completely
independent. Furthermore, activities can only be "coordinated" with respect to some goals or evaluation criteria.
For example, an automobile manufacturing company might be thought of as having a set of goals (producing several
different lines of automobiles) and a set of actors (people) who perform activities (designing and assembling cars)
that achieve these goals. These activities may have various kinds of interdependencies such as using the same
resources (a station on an assembly line) or needing to be done in a certain order (a car must usually be designed
before it is built). As another example, a computer network can be thought of as having a set of goals
(computations to be performed) and a set of actors (computer processors of various types) that perform the tasks
necessary to achieve these goals, subject to various interdependencies (such as using the same data).
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Coordination is attributed to a situation by observers. It is important to realize that the actors involved in a
situation may or may not all agree on the identification of all these components. Instead, one or more of these
components may be attributed by an observer in order to analyze the situation in terms of coordination. For
instance, we may sometimes analyze everything that happens in a manufacturing division as one "activity," while at
other times, we may want to analyze each station on an assembly line as a separate "activity." Sometimes, we
might even regard different processes in the brain of a single person as separate activities performed by separate actors
(e.g., Minsky, 1987).
One important case of this attribution occurs in attributing goals to actors. For instance, it is often useful to
analyze biological systems in terms of the goal of survival and to assume that the process of natural selection will
result in an optimal set of traits (Stephens and Krebs, 1986).
In analyzing human actors, it is often useful to simply ask people what their goals are and analyze their behavior in
terms of these stated goals. In some cases, however, people may be unable or unwilling to accurately report their
goals. And even if people think they are accurately reporting their goals, it may also be useful to analyze their
behavior with respect to other evaluation criteria. For instance, the behavior of managers is often better explained by
assuming that they try to maximize their own power and status (e.g., by increasing revenues) rather than trying to
maximize the profits of the shareholders in their firm. One form of this view is what Dennet (1987) calls the
"intentional stance:" since there is no completely reliable way to determine someone's goals (or if, indeed they have
goals at all), we, as observers, can only impute goals to the actors. The key issue, then, is how useful the imputed
goals are in understanding the behavior of the system.
In cases where individual actors in a system have conflicting goals, it is often useful to analyze the behavior of the
system in terms of some overall goals (or evaluation criteria) in which we are interested. For instance, even though
two designers on a project team may have strongly opposing views about how a product should be designed, we can
evaluate their collective behavior in terms of the quality of the final design. In human organizations, situations in
which actors have at least partly conflicting goals are nearly universal, and mixtures of cooperation and conflict are
quite common (e.g., Ciborra, 1987; Schelling, 1960; Williamson, 1985). When we analyze the coordination in
these situations, we must (at least implicitly) evaluate the actors' collective behavior in terms of how well it
achieves some overall goals (which may or may not be held by the actors themselves).
Another important example of conflicting goals occurs in market transactions: All participants in a market might
have the goal of maximizing their own benefits, but we, as observers, can evaluate the market as a coordination
mechanism in terms of how well it achieves global goals such as maximizing consumer utilities (e.g., Debreu,
1959) or "fairly" distributing economic resources.
A narrow definition of coordination. The decomposition of coordination into components also suggests another
definition for coordination. The broad definition of coordination (discussed in section 2.1) includes almost
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everything that happens when actors work together: setting goals, selecting actors, and performing all the other
activities that need to be done. For some purposes, it is useful to be able to focus explicitly on the elements that are
unique to coordination, that is, on the aspects of "working together" that are not simply part of "working." In our
analysis of the broad definition above, the element of coordination that was implied by the word "together" was
interdependencies. Therefore, when we want to focus specifically on the aspects of a situation that are unique to
coordination, we will use the following narrow definition:
Coordination is the act of managing interdependencies between activities.
This emphasis on the importance of interdependence is consistent with a long history in organization theory of
emphasizing the same theme (e.g., Galbraith, 1973; Hart and Estrin, 1990; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Pfeffer,
1978; Rockart and Short, 1989; Thompson, 1967). It is also consistent with the simple intuition that, if there is no
interdependence, there is nothing to coordinate.
Are multiple actors necessary for coordination to occur? In our previous work (e.g., Malone, 1988), we defined
coordination as something that occurs only when multiple actors are involved. Since then, however, we have
become convinced that the essential elements of coordination listed above arise whenever multiple, interdependent
activities are performed to achieve goals-even if only one actor performs all of them. For instance, if a single
person is cooking a meal, that person must coordinate the preparation of multiple dishes, including resource
conflicts, timing interdependencies, and so forth.
3.2. Basic coordination processes
A central concern for coordination theory is understanding the basic processes involved in coordination: Are there
fundamental coordination processes that occur in all coordinated systems? How can we represent and analyze these
processes? Is it possible to characterize situations in a way that helps generate and choose appropriate coordination
mechanisms for them?
Taxonomies for coordination processes. One question that arises immediately is how to distinguish between
different coordination processes. For instance, one taxonomy is suggested in Table 1: Each component of
coordination (goals, activities, actors, and interdependencies) is associated with processes that determine or manage it
Crowston (1991) suggests a more structured taxonomy based on the possible relationships between "tasks" and
"objects." The further development of such taxonomies is an important goal for coordination theory. For our
purposes here, however, we simply describe several examples of pervasive coordination processes without claiming
that all these processes are necessary in every case or that the categories in this list are mutually exclusive or
exhaustive.
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3.2.1. Goal selection and goal decomposition
Top-down goal decomposition. As we noted above, the definition of coordination implies multiple activities related
to some goal(s). Therefore, in order for coordination to occur, these goals and activities must somehow be identified.
The most commonly analyzed case of this process occurs when an individual or group decides to pursue a goal, and
then decomposes this goal into activities (or subgoals) which together will achieve the original goal. In this case,
we call the process of choosing the goal goal selection, and the process of choosing the activities goal
decomposition.
For example, the strategic planning process in human organizations is often viewed as involving this kind of goal
selection and goal decomposition process. Furthermore, an important role for all managers in a traditionally
conceived hierarchy is to decompose the goals they are given into tasks that they can, in turn, delegate to people who
work for them. There are, in general, many ways a given goal can be broken into pieces, and a long-standing topic
in organization theory involves analyzing different possible decompositions such as by function, by product, by
customer and by geographical region (Mintzberg, 1979). Some of these different goal decompositions for human
organizations are analogous to ways computer systems can be structured (e.g., Malone and Smith, 1988).
In computer systems, we usually think of the goals as being predetermined, but an important problem involves how
to break these goals into activities that can be performed separately. In a sense, for example, the essence of all
computer programming is decomposing goals into elementary activities. For instance, programming techniques
such as subroutine calls, modular programming, object oriented programming, and so forth can all be thought of as
techniques for structuring the process of goal decomposition (Liskov and Guttag, 1986). In these cases the goal
decomposition is performed by a human programmer. Another example of goal decomposition in computer systems
is provided by work on planning in artificial intelligence (e.g., Allen, et al.; Chapman, 1987; Fikes and Nilsson,
1971). In this case, goals are decomposed by a planning program into a sequence of elementary activities, based on
knowledge of the elementary activities available, their prerequisites, and their effects.
In some cases, techniques for goal decomposition used in computer systems may suggest new ways of structuring
human organizations. For example, Moses (1990) suggests that human organizations might sometimes be better off
not as strict hierarchies but as multi-layered structures in which any actor at one level could direct the activities of
any actor at the next level down. This multi-layered structure is analogous to successive layers of languages or
"virtual machines" in a computer system (see Malone, 1990).
Bottom-up goal identification. Even though the most commonly analyzed cases of coordination involve a sequential
process of goal selection and then goal decomposition, our definition of coordination does not require that things
happen in this order. Another possibility, for instance, is that several actors realize that the things they are already
doing (with small additions) could work together to achieve a new goal. For example, the creation of a new
interdisciplinary research group may have this character. It is also possible, as we noted above, for an external
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observer to analyze the behavior of a group of actors in terms of a "goal" that none of the individual actors actually
has. In order to include these different possibilities for who determines goals and activities and the order in which
they are determined, we intentionally used the general terms "identifying goals" and "mapping goals to activities" in
Table 1.
3.2.2. Resource allocation (managing resource interdependencies)
Whenever multiple activities share some limited resource (e.g., money, storage space, or an actor's time), then some
resource allocation process is needed to manage the interdependencies among these activities. Resource allocation is
perhaps the most widely studied of all coordination processes. For example, much of economics and operations
research is devoted to studying various resource allocation processes. As we saw above, resource allocation issues
also arise in computer processor scheduling and memory management, and substantial work has been done on both
these topics (e.g., Cytron, 1987; Halstead, 1985). Organization theory has investigated the extensive effects resource
dependencies often have on entire organizational structures (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and has studied various
hierarchical resource allocation processes (e.g., Burton and Obel, 1980a; Burton and Obel, 1980b). From the point
of view of individual human organizations, a key aspect of the resource allocation problem involves attracting
resources (e.g., employees and money) away from other possible activities (Barnard, 1964).
One important special case of resource allocation is task assignment, that is, allocating the scarce time of actors to
the tasks they will perform. Part of this process can be viewed as selecting actors to perform tasks based on their
capabilities, other possible tasks they could do, and so forth (see section 3.4). Another part of this process involves
establishing agreements between task requestors and task performers about who will perform the task, what the task
consists of, and whether it has been satisfactorily completed. Winograd and Flores (1986) analyze this mutual
agreeing part of the process using concepts from linguistics and computer science (see section 4.2.1).
3.2.3. Sequencing and synchronizing (managing timing interdependencies)
Another pervasive coordination problem involves getting a group of activities to occur at the right times with
respect to each other. Sometimes one activity must finish before others can begin. We call managing this kind of
interdependency sequencing. In other cases, several activities must all occur at the same time. We call managing
this kind of interdependency synchronizing. Sequencing and synchronizing are both common problems in human
organizations, and a number of techniques have been developed to deal with them. For instance, techniques from
operations research, such as PERT charts and critical path methods, are designed to help manage large projects with
multiple activities and complex prerequisite structures. Sequencing and synchronizing problems arise frequently in
computer systems, as well. For instance, one of the key issues in taking advantage of parallel processing computers
is determining which activities can be done in parallel and which ones must wait for the completion of others
(Arvind and Culler, 1986; Holt, 1988; Peterson, 1977; Peterson, 1981). Some of these ideas from computer science
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have also been used to help streamline processes in human organizations by taking advantage of their latent
parallelism (e.g., Ellis, et al., 1979).
In practice, timing interdependencies often arise in the context of scarce resources, and many of the formal techniques
for managing timing interdependencies also involve resource allocation. For example, scheduling techniques
developed in operations research often allocate scarce resources to the most important activities while simultaneously
satisfying prerequisite constraints (Conway, et al., 1967). As another example, the mutual exclusion or
synchronization problem in computer science involves preventing two different processes from simultaneously
accessing the same resource (e.g., Dijkstra, 1968). For example, if two processes simultaneously read and then add
to the same value in a database, the results are unpredictable. It is clear that this problem has important timing
aspects. However, it can also be viewed as a resource allocation problem since the data being updated is a kind of
resource that can only be used by one process at a time.
3.2.4. Managing other interdependencies
The three kinds of interdependencies discussed above are quite common, as reflected by the large number of
techniques developed for managing them. It seems clear, however, that there are many other kinds of possible
interdependencies.
Generic interdependencies. Some of these other interdependencies are generic. For example, one possible
relationship between two tasks is that they duplicate each other. In this case, it may be possible to merge the two
tasks or eliminate one of them. For example, if two engineers are unintentionally designing different parts that do
the same thing, effort might be saved by eliminating one of the parts. In many situations, it is also important to
manage interdependencies between different objects. For example, mechanical engineers must manage
interdependencies between parts that touch each other or that interact physically in other ways.
Specific interdependencies. Other kinds of interdependencies are specific to the particular actions involved. For
instance, people from different parts of a company who deal with the same customer are interdependent to the degree
that they each affect the customer's perception of the company. As another example, the actions of designing and
manufacturing a part are interdependent in that the manufacturing process constrains how the part can be designed In
this case, for instance, the designer and the manufacturer can manage the interdependence by negotiating the design in
joint meetings. Alternatively, some of the knowledge about the constraints of one task can be moved to the other
engineer. For example, some of the manufacturer's knowledge about manufacturing constraints can be made
available to the designer by training the designer in methodologies such as Design For Manufacturing (DFM).
A catalogue of interdependencies and the processes for managing them? One intriguing possibility here is that it
may be possible to develop a "catalogue" or "engineering handbook" of common kinds interdependencies (such as
those just described) and various processes for managing them. For example, such a handbook might include a
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Process Level Components Examples of Generic Processes
Coordination goals, activities, actors, identifying goals, ordering activities, assigning activities to
interdependencies actors, allocating resources, synchronizing activities
Group decision- goals, actors, alternatives, proposing alternatives, evaluating alternatives, making
making evaluations, choices choices (e.g., by authority, consensus, or voting)
Communication senders, receivers, messages, establishing common languages, selecting receiver
languages (routing), transporting message (delivering)
Perception of actors, objects seeing same physical objects, accessing shared databases
common objects
I I I 1 1 3 i i i i i I i i I I I_
Table 2. Processes underlying coordination.
number of common alternative processes for managing the interdependencies involved in designing parts to be easily
manufactured (e.g., see Crowston, 1991). One of our hopes is that identifying these additional interdependencies
may also lead to the development of new formal techniques for managing some of them analogous to the formal
techniques that have already been developed for resource allocation and timing.
3.3. Processes underlying coordination
In attempting to characterize more precisely different coordination processes, we have found it useful to describe them
in terms of successively deeper levels of underlying processes, each of which depends on the levels below it. Table 2
shows a diagram of these levels. For instance, most of the coordination processes listed above in the last column of
Table 1 require that some decision be accepted by a group (e.g., what goal will be selected or which actors will
perform which activities). Group decisions, in turn, often require members of the group to communicate in some
form about the goals to be achieved, the alternatives being considered, the evaluations of these alternatives, and the
choices that are made. This communication requires that some form of "messages" be transported from senders to
receivers in a language that is understandable to both. Finally, the establishment of this common language and the
transportation of messages depends, ultimately, on the ability of actors to perceive common objects such as physical
objects in a shared situation or shared information in a computer database. These layers are analogous to abstraction
levels in other systems, such as protocol layers for network communications.
The order of these layers reflects the observation that each layer uses processes from the layers below it. For
instance, group decision-making requires that the members be able to communicate in some way. However, unlike
most network protocols, there are also times when a layer uses processes from the layers above it. For instance, a
group may sometimes use decision-making processes to extend the common language it uses to communicate (e.g,
see Lee and Malone, 1990), or a group may use coordination processes to assign decision-making activities to actors.
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3.3.1. Group decision-making
By group decision making, we mean the process by which a group of actors choose a consistent set of alternatives.
For example, in a task assignment process, actors must agree on an assignment of actors to tasks, possibly subject
to constraints (e.g., all tasks must be assigned to a single actor capable of doing the task; the load on actors should
be balanced). Obvious possible assignment processes include authority (i.e., the "boss" decides and tells everyone),
consensus (all actors agree on an assignment) or voting. Note that this model of group decision-making does not
require that all actors agree on a single "best" alternative or even be aware that a decision was made. For example, in
a decentralized organization, an actor may independently elect to perform a task, making it unnecessary for other
actors to even consider doing it.
There is already a large body of literature on decision theory (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Luce and Raiffa,
1957) and problem solving (e.g., Newell and Simon, 1972; Nilsson, 1971) that applies primarily to individual
decision making. Some work also focuses on problems of group decision-making (e.g., Simon, 1976). For
instance, the "Arrow impossibility theorem" (Arrow, 1951) examines the difficulty of reconciling the preferences of
different individuals using any of these methods. It shows that there is no non-dictatorial way to always reconcile
individual preferences without violating other sensible conditions such as that introducing irrelevant alternatives
should not change the group's choice.
An intriguing question suggested by this framework is how the existing work on decision-making should be
augmented to include group decision-making. For instance, are there decision-making biases in groups (e.g., Janis
and Mann, 1977) that are analogous to the individual decision-making biases described by Kahneman & Tversky
(1973)? How do computer-based group decision-making tools affect these processes (e.g., Dennis, et al., 1988;
Kiesler, et al., 1984; Kraemer and King, 1988)? Can we determine optimal ways of allocating tasks and sharing
information for making group decisions (Miao, et al., in press).
3.3.2. Communication
As with decision-making, there is a already a great deal of theory about communication, both from a technical point
of view (e.g., Shannon and Weaver, 1949) and from an organizational point of view (e.g., Allen, 1977; Rogers and
Agarwala-Rogers, 1976; Weick, 1969). However, a coordination framework highlights several somewhat novel
aspects to these problems. For one thing, it emphasizes questions about why the communication is occurring in the
first place (e.g., to aid decision-making or to allocate resources). For another thing, it suggests the importance of
several questions that have not yet been heavily studied.
For instance: How can actors establish common languages that allow them to communicate in the first place? This
question of developing standards for communication is of crucial concern in designing computer networks in general
(Dertouzos, 1991) and cooperative work tools in particular (e.g., Lee and Malone, 1988). The process by which
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standards are developed is also of concern to economists, philosophers, and others (e.g., Farrell and Saloner, 1985;
Hirsch, 1987).
Another set of questions highlighted by our framework is: How can information be routed to the right actors (e.g.,
Allen, 1977; Hewitt, 1977; Malone, et al., 1987)? More specifically, what do we have to know about actors' goals
and task assignments to determine which actors should know which kinds of information (e.g., Marschak and
Radner, 1972)?
3.3.3. Perception of common objects
In a sense, the ability of actors to communicate or work together at all depends ultimately on their ability to perceive
the same things. For instance, Lynch and Fischer (1981) base their analysis of distributed computing on the premise
that different processes have some shared variables. Similarly, there is growing literature in computer science,
economics, and linguistics on how distributed actors can come to have "common knowledge" of a fact (Aumann,
1976; Halpern, 1987; Milgrom, 1981). For instance, in the "coordinated attack" problem, two generals are
overlooking a common enemy from opposite hilltops and can communicate only via messengers who may be
delayed or captured by the enemy. If the generals attack together, they will defeat the enemy; if either attacks alone,
he will be defeated. Surprisingly, it can be shown that if the messengers are unreliable, the generals can never be
sure they will both attack at the same time (Gray, 1978; Halpern and Moses, 1986).
At a higher level, computer-based communication among people ultimately depends on either some kind of shared
database or some kind of messages which are transported from one person to another. At a different level, Suchman
(1987), Winograd and Flores (1986), and others observe that all human action is grounded in shared situations. Thus
ambiguities can be resolved and "breakdowns" can be "repaired" by appealing to the always present-but usually
implicit-features of these shared situations.
3.4. Example: Analyzing the task assignment process
To illustrate the possibilities for developing theories of coordination that apply to many different kinds of systems,
let us consider the task assignment process as analyzed by Malone and Smith (Malone, 1987; Malone and Smith,
1988; see also related work by Baligh and Richartz, 1967; Burton and Obel, 1980a). As we have described in more
detail elsewhere (Malone, in press), these analyses illustrate precisely the kind of interdisciplinary interaction that
coordination theory encourages: the models grew originally out of designing distributed computer systems, they
drew upon results from operations research, and they led eventually to new insights about the evolution of human
organizations.
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3.4.1. A generic task assignment problem
Consider the following task assignment problem: A system is producing a set of "products," each of which requires
a set of "tasks" to be performed. The tasks are of various types, and each type of task can only be performed by
"server" actors specialized for that kind of task. Furthermore, the specific tasks to be performed cannot be predicted
in advance; they only become known during the course of the process and then only to actors we will call "clients."
This description of the task assignment problem is certainly not universally applicable, but it is an abstract
description that can be applied to many common task assignment situations. For instance, the tasks might be
(1) designing, manufacturing, and marketing different kinds of automobiles, or (2) processing steps in different jobs
on a computer network.
As suggested by Table 2, the coordination problem in this situation involves a group decision about which actors
will perform which tasks. In order to make this decision rationally, two kinds of information must be considered:
(1) information about what tasks need to be done, and (2) information about which actors are qualified and available
to do the tasks. Furthermore, once the decision has been made, the server actors have to be notified what tasks they
will perform. The coordination mechanisms we will consider for solving this task assignment problem involve
various ways of communicating this information (e.g., via messages), and in order for this communication to occur,
both the senders and receivers must share some representations of common objects (such as the descriptions of tasks
and actors' capabilities).
3.4.2. Possible coordination mechanisms
One (highly centralized) possibility for solving this task assignment problem is for all the clients and servers to send
all their information to a central decision maker who decides which servers will perform which tasks and then
notifies them accordingly. Another (highly decentralized) possibility is suggested by the competitive bidding scheme
for computer networks formalized by Smith and Davis (1981). In this scheme, a client first broadcasts an
announcement message to all potential servers. This message includes a description of the activity to be performed
and the qualifications required. The potential servers then use this information to decide whether to submit a bid on
the action. If they decide to bid, their bid message includes a description of their qualifications and their availability
for performing the action. The client uses these bid messages to decide which server should perform the activity and
then sends an award message to notify the server that is selected.
Malone and Smith (Malone, 1987; Malone and Smith, 1988) analyzed several alternative coordination mechanisms
like these, each of which is analogous to a mechanism used in human organizations. In particular, they developed
formal models to represent various forms of markets (centralized and decentralized) and various forms of hierarchies
(based on products or functions). Then they used techniques from queueing theory and probability theory to analyze
tradeoffs among these structures in terms of production costs, coordination costs, and vulnerability costs. For
instance, they showed that the centralized schemes had lower coordination costs, but were more vulnerable to
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processor failures. Decentralized markets, on the other hand, were much less vulnerable to processor failures but had
high coordination costs. And decentralized hierarchies ("product hierarchies") had low coordination costs, but they
had unused processor capacity which lead to high production costs.
3.4.3. Applying these models to various kinds of systems
Even though these models omit many important aspects of human organizations and computer systems they help
illuminate a surprisingly wide range of phenomena. For instance, as Malone and Smith (1988) show, the models are
consistent with a number of previous theories about human organizational design (e.g., Galbraith, 1973; March and
Simon, 1958; Williamson, 1985) and with major historical changes in the organizational forms of both human
organizations (Chandler, 1962; Chandler, 1977) and computer systems. These models also help analyze design
alternatives for distributed scheduling mechanisms in computer systems, and they suggest ways of analyzing the
structural changes associated with introducing new information technology into organizations (section 4.1 of this
paper, Crowston, et al., 1987; Malone and Smith, 1988).
3.5. Summary of coordination processes
Table 3 loosely summarizes our discussion of coordination processes by listing examples of analyses of coordination
processes in different disciplines. The key point of this table, and indeed of much of our discussion, is that the
concepts of coordination theory help identify similarities among concepts and results in different disciplines. These
similarities, in turn, suggest how ideas can be transported back and forth across disciplinary boundaries and where
opportunities exist to develop even deeper analyses.
4. APPLICATIONS OF COORDINATION THEORY
We describe in this section examples of how concepts about coordination have been applied in three different areas:
(1) understanding the new possibilities for human organizations and markets provided by information technology,
(2) designing cooperative work tools, and (3) designing distributed and parallel computer systems. This list is not
intended to be a comprehensive list of all coordination theory applications. In fact, most of the work we describe
here did not explicitly use the term "coordination theory." We have chosen examples, however, to illustrate the wide
range of applications for interdisciplinary theories about coordination.
4.1. Understanding the effects of information technology on organizations and markets
Managers, organization theorists, and others have long been interested in how the widespread use of information
technology (IT) may change the ways human organizations and markets will be structured (e.g., Leavitt and Whisler,
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Coordination Goal
decomposition
Resource
allocation
(including task
assignment)
Sequencing and
synchronizing
Group decision- Proposing,
making evaluating, and
selecting
alternatives
Communi- Establishing
cation common
languages
Routing
Perception of Seeing and
common manipulating
objects shared
information
Computer Science
modularization
techniques in
programming; planning
in artificial intelligence
techniques for processor
scheduling and memory
allocation
synchronization
techniques; data flow and
Petri net analyses
Economics and Operations
Research
economies of scale and
scope
analyses of markets and
other resource allocation
mechanisms; scheduling
algorithms and other
optimization techniques
Organization Theory
strategic planning;
management by
objectives; methods of
grouping people into
units
analyses of different
organizational structures;
budgeting processes,
organizational power, and
resource dependence
PERT charts, critical path
methods; scheduling
techniques
search techniques in decision theory and other behavioral decision
artificial intelligence optimization techniques theory; analyses of
organizational decision-
making
communication analyses of standards studies of shared
standards; polymorphism formation processes languages and culture
in object-oriented
programming
message passing analyses of the value of studies of organizational
languages; analyzing information communication patterns
data flows; network
name servers
shared variables; theories of common theories of situated action
common knowledge; knowledge
shared databases
Table 3. Examples of previous analyses of coordination processes in different disciplines
1958; Simon, 1976). One of the most important contributions of coordination theory may be to help understand
these possibilities better.
To illustrate this approach, we begin with the simple observation that coordination is itself an activity that has costs
and benefits.1 Even though there are many other forces that may affect the way coordination is performed in
organizations and markets (e.g., global competition, government regulation, interest rates), one important factor is
1 See Malone (in press) for another version of this discussion.
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clearly its cost. Furthermore, it seems quite plausible to assume that information technology is likely to
significantly reduce the costs of certain kinds of coordination (e.g., Crawford, 1982).
Now, using some elementary ideas from microeconomics about substitution and elasticity of demand, we can make
some simple predictions about the possible effects of reducing coordination costs. It is useful to illustrate these
effects by analogy with similar changes in the costs of transportation induced by the introduction of trains and
automobiles:
(1) A "first order" effect of reducing transportation costs with trains and automobiles was simply some
substitution of the new transportation technologies for the old: people began to ride on trains more
and in horse-drawn carriages less.
(2) A "second order" effect of reducing transportation costs was to increase the amount of transportation
used: people began to travel more when this could be done more cheaply and conveniently in trains
than on foot.
(3) Finally, a "third order" effect was to allow the creation of more "transportation-intensive" structures:
people eventually began to live in distant suburbs and use shopping malls-both examples of new
structures that depended on the widespread availability of cheap and convenient transportation.
Similarly, we can expect several effects from using new information technologies to reduce the costs of coordination:
(1) A "first order" effect of reducing coordination costs with information technology may be to substitute
information technology for some human coordination. For instance, it has long been commonplace
to predict that computers will lead to the demise of middle management because the communication
tasks performed by middle managers could be performed less expensively by computers (e.g., Leavitt
and Whisler, 1958). In fact, it is still not clear that this prediction has been fulfilled, perhaps, in part,
because of the following second and third order effects.
(2) A "second order" effect of reducing coordination costs may be to increase the overall amount of
coordination used. In some cases, this may overwhelm the first order effect. For instance, in one case
we studied, a computer conferencing system was used to help remove a layer of middle managers (see
Crowston, et al., 1987). Several years later, however, almost the same number of new positions (for
different people at the same grade level) had been created for staff specialists in the corporate staff
group, many of whom were helping to develop new computer systems. One interpretation of this
outcome is that the managerial resources no longer needed for simple communication tasks could now
be applied to more complex analysis tasks that would not previously have been undertaken.
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(3) A "third order" effect of reducing coordination costs may be to encourage a shift toward the use of
more "coordination-intensive" structures. In other words, coordination structures that were previously
too "expensive" will now become more feasible and desirable. What might these new coordination-
intensive structures be like? Let us consider recent work on three specific questions about these new
structures: (a) How will IT affect the size of organizations? (b) How will IT affect the degree of
centralization of decision-making in organizations? and (c) How will IT affect the internal structure of
organizations?
4.1.1. Firm size
Malone, Yates, and Benjamin (1987) have used ideas from transaction cost theory to systematically analyze how
information technology will affect firm size and, more generally, the use of markets as a coordination structure.
They conclude that by reducing the costs of coordination, information technology may lead to an overall shift toward
smaller firms and proportionately more use of markets-rather than internal decisions within firms--to coordinate
economic activity.
This argument has two parts. First, since market transactions often have higher coordination costs than internal
coordination (Malone, et al., 1987; Williamson, 1985), an overall reduction in the "unit costs" of coordination
should lead to markets becoming more desirable in situations where internal transactions were previously favored.
This, in turn, should lead to less vertical integration and smaller firms.
For example, after the introduction of computerized airline reservation systems, the proportion of reservations made
through travel agents (rather than by calling the airline directly) went from 35% to 70%. Thus, the function of
selling reservations was "disintegrated" from the airlines and moved to a separate firm---the travel agents.
Preliminary econometric analyses of the overall U.S. economy in the period 1975-1985 are also consistent with
these predictions: the use of information technology appears to be correlated with decreases in both firm size and
vertical integration (Brynjolfsson, et al., 1989).
4.1.2. Centralization of decision-making
Gurbaxani & Whang (1991) have used ideas from agency theory to systematically analyze the effects on
centralization of the reductions in coordination costs enabled by IT. They conclude that IT can lead to either
centralization or decentralization, depending on how it is used. While this conclusion may not be surprising, the
structure of their analysis helps us understand the factors involved more clearly: (1) When IT primarily reduces
decision information costs, it leads to more centralization. For instance, the Otis elevator company used IT to
centralize the reporting and dispatching functions of their customer service system, instead of having these functions
distributed to numerous remote field offices (Stoddard, 1986). (2) On the other hand, when IT primarily reduces
agency costs, it leads to more decentralization. As used here, agency costs are the costs of employees not acting in
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the interests of the firm. For instance, when one insurance company developed a system that more effectively
monitored their salespeople's overall performance, they were able to decentralize to the salespeople many of the
decisions that had previously been made centrally (Bruns and McFarlan, 1987). Overall, this bidirectional trend for
IT and centralization is consistent with empirical studies of this question (Attewell and Rule, 1984).
4.1.3. Internal structure of organizations
In addition to the changes already noted, we should also expect the internal structures of organizations to become
more coordination-intensive. For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) show mathematically how increases in
computer-supported coordination are consistent with a large cluster of other organizational attributes such as: closer
integration between process and product engineering, extensive use of external suppliers, shorter product cycle times,
and very low inventories.
As another example, Malone and Smith (1988) suggest that information technology can facilitate what some
observers (e.g., Mintzberg, 1979; Toffler, 1970) have called adhocracies. As noted above, adhocracies are very
flexible organizations, including many shifting project teams and highly decentralized networks of communication
among relatively autonomous entrepreneurial groups. One of the disadvantages of adhocracies as a coordination
structure is that they require large amounts of unplanned communication and coordination throughout an
organization. However, technologies such as electronic mail and computer conferencing can help reduce the costs of
this communication, and advanced information sharing tools (e.g., Lotus, 1989; Malone, et al., 1987) may help
make this communication more effective at much larger scales.
Imagining new kinds of human organizations. As these last examples suggests, one of the most important
questions that coordination theory may help answer is what new kinds of coordination structures will emerge in the
electronically connected world of the near future. What are the organizational equivalents of suburbs and shopping
malls that information technology may make possible?
An intriguing possibility is that we may be able to use analogies with coordination structures in other kinds of
systems to generate ideas for new kinds of human organizations. For example, would coordination structures like
those used in bee hives or ant colonies be useful for certain kinds of human organizations? Might it be possible, for
instance, to create knowledge structures that many people could "swarm" around, filling in things they know, until a
complete picture of what to do emerges? Or could there be marketplaces of "intellectual mercenaries" in which it is
possible to electronically assemble "overnight armies" of thousands of people who work for a few hours or days to
solve a particular problem? Generating and understanding these new possibilities will require precisely the kind of
theories that coordination theory should be able to help us develop.
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4.2. Designing cooperative work tools
There has recently been a great deal of interest in designing computer tools to help people work together more
effectively (e.g., Ellis, et al., 1991; Greif, 1988; Johansen, 1988; Peterson, 1986; Tatar, 1988; Tatar, 1990;
additional references in Table 4). Using terms such as "computer-supported cooperative work" and "groupware" these
systems perform functions such as helping people collaborate on writing the same document, managing projects,
keeping track of tasks, and finding, sorting, and prioritizing electronic messages. Other systems in this category
help people display and manipulate information more effectively in face-to-face meetings and represent and share the
rationales for group decisions.
In this section, we will describe how ideas about coordination have been helpful in suggesting new systems,
classifying systems, and analyzing how these systems are used.
4.2.1. Using coordination concepts from other disciplines to suggest design ideas
One way of generating new design ideas for cooperative work tools is to look to other disciplines that deal with
coordination. For instance, even though the following authors did not explicitly use the term "coordination theory,"
they each used ideas about coordination from other disciplines to help develop cooperative work tools.
Using ideas from linguistics and philosophy about speech acts. Winograd and Flores (Flores, et al., 1988;
Winograd, 1987; Winograd and Flores, 1986) have developed a theoretical perspective for analyzing group action
based heavily on ideas from linguistics (e.g., Searle, 1975). This perspective emphasizes different kinds of speech
acts, such as requests and commitments. For example, Winograd and Flores analyzed a generic "conversation for
action" in terms of the possible states and transitions involved when one actor performs a task at the request of
another. An actor may respond to a request, for instance, by (1) promising to fulfill the request, (2) declining the
request, (3) reporting that the request has already been completed, or (4) simply acknowledging that the request has
been received. The analysis of this conversation type (and several others) provided a primary basis for designing the
Coordinator, a computer-based cooperative work tool. For example, the Coordinator helps people make and keep
track of requests and commitments to each other. It thus supports what we might call the "mutual agreeing" part of
the task assignment process.
Using ideas from artificial intelligence and organization theory about blackboards and adhocracies. Malone (1990)
describes how ideas from artificial intelligence and organization theory combined to suggest a new tool for routing
information within organizations. In the "blackboard architecture," program modules interact by searching a global
blackboard for their inputs and posting their outputs on the same blackboard (Erman, et al., 1980; Nii, 1986). This
provides very flexible patterns of communication between different program modules: any module can communicate
with any other module, even when this interaction is not explicitly anticipated by the program designer. In
adhocracies, as we saw above, just this kind of unplanned, highly decentralized communication is essential for
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rapidly responding to new situations (Mintzberg, 1979; Toffler, 1970). Stimulated, in part, by this need for an
"organizational blackboard," Malone and colleagues designed the Information Lens system (Malone, et al., 1987). A
central component of this system is an "anyone server" that lets people specify rules about what kinds of electronic
messages they are interested in seeing. The system then uses these rules to route all non-private electronic messages
to everyone in the organization who might want to see them. (To help people deal with large numbers of messages,
another part of the system uses a different set of rules to sort and prioritize the messages people receive.)
Using ideas from philosophy and rhetoric about decision-making. Two cooperative work tools, gIBIS (Conklin and
Begeman, 1988) and Sibyl (Lee, 1990) are designed to help groups of people make decisions more effectively. To do
this, they explicitly represent the arguments (and counter arguments) for different alternatives a group might choose.
Both these systems are based on ideas from philosophy and rhetoric about the logical structure of decision-making.
For example, the basic elements in the gIBIS system (issues, positions, and arguments) are taken from a
philosophical analysis of argumentation by Rittel (1970). The constructs for representing arguments in Sibyl are
based on the work of philosophers like Toulmin (1958) and Rescher (1977).
Using ideasfrom computer science about parallel processes. Holt (Holt, 1988) describes a theoretical language used
for designing coordination tools that is based, in part, on ideas about Petri nets, a formalism used in computer
science to represent process flows in distributed or parallel systems (Peterson, 1977; Peterson, 1981). This language
is part of a larger theoretical framework called "coordination mechanics" and has been used to design a "coordination
environment" to help people work together on computer networks.
Summary of examples. Clearly, drawing a line around these examples and calling them "coordination theory" does
not, in itself, provide any benefit. Nor does using ideas about coordination from other disciplines provide any
guarantee of developing useful cooperative work tools. Nevertheless, we feel that considering these examples within
the common framework of coordination theory provides two benefits: (1) it suggests that no one of these
perspectives is the complete story, and (2) it suggests that we should look to previous work in various disciplines
for more insights about coordination that could lead to new cooperative work tools.
4.2.2. A taxonomy of cooperative work tools
As shown in Table 4, the framework we have suggested for coordination provides a natural way of classifying
existing cooperative work systems according to the coordination processes they support. Some of these systems
primarily emphasize a single coordination-related process. For instance, electronic mail systems primarily support
the message transport process, and meeting scheduling tools primarily support the synchronization process (i.e.,
arranging for several people to attend a meeting at the same time). There is a sense, of course, in which each of
these systems also support other processes (e.g., a simple electronic mail system can be used to assign tasks), but
we have categorized the systems here according to the processes they explicitly emphasize.
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Many of the systems explicitly support several processes. For example, the gIBIS and Sibyl systems explicitly
support at least two group decision-making processes: proposing alternatives and evaluating alternatives. The
Information Lens system supports both the communication routing process (by rules that distribute messages to
interested people) and a form of resource allocation process (by helping people prioritize their own activities using
rules that sort messages they receive). And the Polymer system helps people decompose goals into tasks and
sequence the tasks (e.g., to prepare a monthly report, first gather the project reports and then write a summary
paragraph).
One possibility raised by this framework is that it might help identify new opportunities for cooperative work tools.
For instance, the Coordinator focuses on supporting one part of the task assignment process (mutual agreement on
commitments). However, it does not provide much help for the earlier part of the process involving selecting an
actor to perform the task in the first place (see section 3.4). New tools, such as an "electronic yellow pages" or
bidding schemes like those suggested by Turoff (1983) and Malone (1987) might be useful for this purpose.
Level Process Example systems
Coordination Goal decomposition Polymer (Croft and Lefkowitz, 1988)
Task assignment (agreeing on Coordinator (Winograd and Flores, 1986)
commitments)
Resource allocation (task Information Lens (sorting rules) (Malone, et al., 1987)
prioritization)
Synchronizing Meeting scheduling tools (e.g., Beard, et al., 1990)
Sequencing Polymer (Croft and Lefkowitz, 1988)
Group decision- Proposing alternatives gIBIS (Conklin and Begeman, 1988), Sibyl (Lee, 1990),
making electronic brainstorming tools (e.g., Dennis, et al., 1988;
Stefik, et al., 1987)
Evaluating alternatives gIBIS (Conklin and Begeman, 1988), Sibyl (Lee, 1990)
Communication Transporting messages Electronic mail
Routing Information Lens ("Anyone" rules) (Malone, et al.,
1987), Computer conferencing (e.g., Lotus, 1989)
Perception of Seeing and manipulating shared Computer conferencing (e.g., Lotus, 1989), collaborative
common objects information authoring tools (e.g., Ellis, et al., 1990; Fish, et al.,
1988), electronic meeting rooms (e.g., Dennis, et al.,
1988; DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987; Stefik, et al., 1987)
Table 4. A taxonomy of cooperative work tools based on the processes they support
28
Another intriguing possibility suggested by this framework is that it might be possible to implement "primitives"
for a number of different coordination-related processes in the same environment, and then let people combine these
primitives in various ways to help solve particular coordination problems. This is one of the goals of the Object
Lens system (Lai, et al., 1988).
4.2.3. Analyzing incentives for using cooperative work tools
Another use for coordination theory in designing cooperative work tools is to help systematically evaluate proposed
(or actual) systems. For example, Markus and Connolly (1990) systematically analyze how the payoffs to individual
users of a cooperative work system depend on how many other people are using the system. They do this by using
an economic model from Schelling (1978) to extend Grudin's (1988) insights about the incentives to use cooperative
work systems. For instance, on-line calendars and many other cooperative work applications involve "discretionary
databases" which users can view or update as they see fit. For each individual user, however, the benefits of viewing
the database can be obtained without contributing anything. Thus, it is often in the interests of each individual user
to use the database without making the effort required to contribute to it. Unfortunately, the equilibrium state of a
system like this is for no one to ever contribute anything! One possible solution to this kind of problem is to
change the payoff structure so that, for example, users who do not contribute to the database have to pay more to use
it.
4.3. Designing distributed and parallel processing computer systems
As we noted above, coordination issues are central to the design of distributed and parallel processing computer
systems. In this section, we describe examples of work that has addressed these issues in an explicitly
interdisciplinary way, drawing on insights from other disciplines or kinds of systems to design or analyze distributed
or parallel computer systems. In particular, we consider examples of (1) analogies with social and biological
systems as a source of design ideas, and (2) quantitative tools for analyzing alternative designs.
4.3.1. Analogies with social and biological systems as a source of design ideas
Competitive bidding markets. One of the basic problems in designing distributed or parallel computer systems is
how to assign tasks to processors, and several distributed computer systems have addressed this problem with
competitive bidding mechanisms based on analogies with human markets. For example, the Contract Nets protocol
(Davis and Smith, 1983; Smith and Davis, 1981) formalizes a sequence of messages to be exchanged by computer
processors sharing tasks in a network. The "contracts" are arbitrary computational tasks that can potentially be
performed by any of a number of processors on the network, the "clients" are machines at which these tasks
originate, and the "contractors" are machines that might process the tasks (i.e., the servers). The sequence of
announcement, bid, and award messages used by this protocol was described above in our analysis of the task
assignment process (section 3.4.2). One of the desirable features of this system is its great degree of decentralization
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and the flexibility it provides for how both clients and contractors can make their decisions. For instance, clients
may select contractors on the basis of estimated completion time or the presence of specialized data; contractors may
select tasks to bid on based on the size of the task or how long the task has been waiting.
Using these or similar ideas, a number of other bidding systems have been developed (e.g., Kurose and Simha, 1989;
Stankovic, 1985). For instance, several bidding systems have been developed to allow personal workstations
connected by a local area network to share tasks (Malone, et al., 1988; Waldspurger, et al., 1988). In this way, users
can take advantage of the unused processing capacity at idle workstations elsewhere on the network. Furthermore,
the local bidding "negotiations" can result in globally coherent processor scheduling according to various priorities
(e.g., Malone, et al., 1988). (For a review of several related systems and an analysis of a variety of bidding
algorithms, see Drexler and Miller, 1988; Miller and Drexler, 1988).
The notion of competitive bidding markets has also been suggested as a technique for storage management by Miller
and Drexler (Drexler and Miller, 1988; Miller and Drexler, 1988). In their proposal, when object A wishes to
maintain a pointer to object B, object A pays "rent" to the "landlord" of the space in which object B is stored. These
rents are determined by competitive bidding, and when an object fails to pay rent, it is "evicted" (that is, garbage
collected). Their proposal includes various schemes for how to determine rents, how to pass rents along a chain of
references, and how to keep track of the various costs and payments without excessive overhead. They conclude that
this proposal is not likely to be practical for small scale storage management (such as garbage collection of
individual Lisp cells), but that it may well be useful for sharing large objects in complex networks that cross "trust
boundaries" (e.g., inter-organizational networks). The scheme also appears useful for managing local caching and the
migration of objects between different forms of short-term and long-term storage.
Scientific communities. Another central problem that arises in distributed and parallel processing systems is how
and when to share information between processors. For instance, one interesting example of this problem arises in
artificial intelligence programs that search a large space of possibilities, the nature of which is not well known in
advance. It is particularly useful, in this case, for processors to exchange information about intermediate results in
such a way that each processor can avoid performing work that is rendered unnecessary by work already done
elsewhere
One solution to this problem is suggested by the Scientific Community Metaphor embodied in the Ether system
(Kornfeld, 1982; Kornfeld and Hewitt, 1981). In this system, there are a number of "sprites," each analogous to an
individual scientist, that operate in parallel and interact through a global database. Each sprite requires certain
conditions to be true in the global database before it is "triggered." When a sprite is triggered, it may (1) compute
new results that are added to the global database, (2) create new sprites that await conditions that will trigger them,
or (3) stifle a collection of sprites whose work is now known to be unnecessary. In one example use of this
system, Kornfeld (1982) shows how sharing intermediate results in this way can dramatically improve the time
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performance of an algorithm (even if it is executed by time-sharing a single processor). He calls this effect
"combinatorial implosion."
This system also uses the scientific community metaphor to suggest a solution to the resource allocation problem
for processors. Each sprite is "supported" by a "sponsor," and without a sponsor, a sprite will not receive any
processing time to do its work. For instance, a sponsor may sometimes support both work directed toward proving
some proposition and also work directed toward proving the negation of the proposition. Whenever one of these
lines of work is successful, support is withdrawn from the other.
4.3.2. Analyzing stability properties of load sharing algorithms
Another use of coordination theory ideas is to help evaluate alternative designs of distributed and parallel processing
computer systems. For instance, Huberman and his colleagues (Huberman and Hogg, 1988; Lumer and Huberman,
1990) have applied mathematical techniques like those used in chaos theory to analyze the dynamic behavior of
distributed computer networks. In one case they analyze, for example, heavily loaded processors in a network
transfer tasks to more lightly loaded processors according to a probabilistic process. When any processor in such a
system can exchange tasks with any other processor, the behavior of the system is unstable for large numbers of
processors (e.g., more than 21 processors in a typical example). However, when the processors are grouped
hierarchically into clusters that exchange tasks frequently among themselves and only occasionally with other
clusters, the system remains stable for arbitrarily large numbers of processors. This hierarchical arrangement has
the disadvantage that it takes a long time to reach stability. In an intriguing analogy with human organizations,
however, Huberman and his colleagues find that this disadvantage can be eliminated by having a few "lateral links"
between different clusters in the hierarchy (Lumer and Huberman, 1990).
4.4 Summary of applications
As summarized in Table 5, the examples we have described show how coordination theory can help (1) analyze
alternative designs, and (2) suggest new design ideas. In each case, these applications depended upon
interdisciplinary use of theories or concepts about coordination.
5. RESEARCH AGENDA
We have seen how a number of different disciplines can contribute to answering the questions of coordination theory,
and how theories of coordination can, in turn, be applied to the concerns of several different disciplines. What is
needed to further develop this interdisciplinary study of coordination?
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Application area Examples of analyzing alternative
designs
Examples of generating new design ideas
Organizational structures Analyzing the effects of decreasing Creating temporary "intellectual marketplaces" to
and information coordination costs on firm size, solve specific problems.
technology centralization, and internal structure Human analogs of beehives or dataflow computers
Cooperative work tools Analyzing how the payoffs to Designing new tools for task assignment,
individual users of a system depend information routing, and group decision-making
on the number of other users
Distributed and parallel Analyzing stability properties of Using competitive bidding mechanisms to allocate
computer systems load sharing algorithms in computer processors and memory in computer systems.
networks Using a scientific community metaphor to
organize parallel problem-solving.
Table 5. Sample applications of coordination theory
As we suggested above, a central concern of coordination theory is identifying and analyzing specific coordination
processes and structures. Therefore, a critical item on the agenda for coordination research should be developing these
analyses. For example, the following kinds of questions arise:
5.1.1. Representing and classifying coordination processes
How can we represent coordination processes? When should we use flowcharts, Petri nets, or state transition
diagrams? Are there other notations that are even more perspicuous for analyzing coordination? How can we
classify different coordination processes? For instance, can we usefully regard some coordination processes as
"special cases" of others? How are different coordination processes combined when activities are actually performed?
5.1.2. How general are coordination processes?
Another set of questions has to do with how generic coordination processes really are: How far can we get by
analyzing very general coordination processes, and when will we find that most of the important factors are specific
to coordinating a particular kind of task? For example, are there general heuristics for coordination that are
analogous to the general problem-solving heuristics studied in cognitive science and artificial intelligence?
5.1.3. Analyzing specific processes
At least as important as these general questions are analyses of specific processes. For example, how far can we go
in analyzing alternative coordination processes for problems such as resource allocation? Can we characterize an
entire "design space" for solutions to this problem and analyze the major factors that would favor one solution over
another in specific situations? Could we do the same thing for other processes such as goal selection or managing
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timing interdependencies? Are there other processes (such as managing other kinds of interdependencies) that could
be analyzed systematically in ways that have not yet been done?
In analyzing alternatives processes for specific problems, we might consider various kinds of properties: Which
processes are least "expensive" in terms of production costs and coordination costs? Which processes are fastest?
Which processes are most stable in the face of failures of actors or delays of information? Which processes are most
susceptible to incentive problems? For instance, how does the presence of significant conflicts of interest among
actors affect the desirability of different resource allocation methods? How do information processing limitations of
actors affect the desirability of different methods? For example, are some methods appropriate for coordinating
people that would not be appropriate for coordinating computer processors, and vice versa? What new methods for
coordinating people become desirable when human information processing capacities are augmented by computers?
5.1.4. Applications and methodologies
A critical part of the research agenda for this area is developing coordination theory in the context of various different
kinds of systems. For instance, in section 4, we suggested numerous examples of these possibilities for human
organizations and computer systems.
In some cases, this work may involve applying previously developed theories to these application areas. In many
cases, however, we expect that new systems or new observations of these systems will stimulate the development of
new theories. For example, all of the following methodologies appear likely to be useful in developing coordination
theory: (1) empirically studying coordination in human or other biological systems (e.g., field studies, laboratory
studies, or econometric studies), (2) designing new technologies for supporting human coordination, (3) designing
and experimenting with new methods for coordinating distributed and parallel processing computer systems, and
(4) formal modeling of coordination processes (e.g., mathematical modeling or computer simulation).
6. CONCLUSIONS
Clearly, the questions we have just listed are only the beginning of a set of research issues in the interdisciplinary
study of coordination. However, we believe they illustrate how the notion of "coordination" provides a set of
abstractions that help unify questions previously considered separately in a variety of different disciplines and
suggests avenues for further exploration.
While much work remains to be done, it appears that this approach can build upon much previous work in these
different disciplines to help solve a variety of immediate practical needs, including: (1) designing computer and
communication tools that enable people to work together more effectively, (2) harnessing the power of multiple
computer processors working simultaneously on related problems, and (3) creating more flexible and more satisfying
ways of organizing collective human activity.
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8. APPENDIX:
PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED DEFINITIONS OF COORDINATION
"The operation of complex systems made up of components." (NSF-IRIS, 1989)
"The emergent behavior of collections of individuals whose actions are based on complex decision processes."
(NSF-IRIS, 1989)
"Information processing within a system of communicating entities with distinct information states." (NSF-IRIS,
1989)
"The joint efforts of independent communicating actors towards mutually defined goals." (NSF-IRIS, 1989)
"Networks of human action and commitments that are enabled by computer and communications technologies."
(NSF-IRIS, 1989)
"Composing purposeful actions into larger purposeful wholes." (A. Holt, personal communication, 1989)
"Activities required to maintain consistency within a work product or to manage dependencies within the workflow."
(Curtis, 1989)
"The additional information processing performed when multiple, connected actors pursue goals that a single actor
pursuing the same goals would not perform." (Malone, 1988)
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